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FACT OR PHALLUS? CONSIDERING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TEXAS’S
CYBER-FLASHING LAW UNDER THE
TRUE THREAT DOCTRINE
by: Brenna C. Miller*
ABSTRACT
As societal reliance on digital and online communication continues to grow,
courts are grappling with how best to provide legal recourse for novel, tech-
nology-related issues while still protecting American citizens’ First Amend-
ment right to free speech. The State of Texas recently enacted Penal Code
section 21.19, which criminalizes the transmission of unsolicited sexually ex-
plicit images to another person—or as it is commonly known, “cyber-flash-
ing.” Cyber-flashing occurs through digital and online platforms, including
text messages, apps, and social media. Section 21.19 is one of the first statutes
of its kind in the United States. In the age of “dick pics,” this law has emerged
at a crucial time in an evolving social and technological world. While section
21.19 has ample support, critics argue that it is ultimately unconstitutional.
Proponents argue that it combats sexual harassment and the “growing prob-
lem of aggressive and unsolicited sexual communication online.”1 Addition-
ally, many victims view cyber-flashing as a threatening and intimidating form
of sexual violence. This fact is legally significant, in that the First Amend-
ment’s true threat doctrine allows governmental regulation of speech that
places individuals in fear of harm. This Article argues that section 21.19 is
constitutional under the true threat doctrine and, alternatively, proposes a pos-
sible solution for Texas to ensure the statute’s compliance with First Amend-
ment free speech protections.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I went out on quite a few dates with this guy but eventually we had to
break up . . . but he didn’t take it too well. A few days later, I got a
WhatsApp message from him: “You know you want this,” with a few
dick pics. I happened to open his message in a crowded train . . . . I
exited at the next stop out of embarrassment.2
I couldn’t even tell you how many times I’ve been sent dick pics on
dating apps, specifically Tinder and Bumble and also on WhatsApp
during conversations[,] without me asking.3
I was travelling home alone by bus when a dick pic popped up on my
phone [via AirDrop]. In the space of a second or two I was confused,
shocked, then disgusted. . . . It didn’t occur to me until afterwards that
someone would deliberately send that to a stranger . . . . I didn’t con-
sider reporting it to the transport network or police. I imagine they
would’ve just dismissed it as a prank.4
While these personal experiences may seem unsettling or frustrat-
ing, they are not unique—in fact, they are all too common in our mod-
ern technological world.5 “Dick pics,” as these women describe them,
are a product of evolving technology. It is difficult to imagine, for ex-
ample, a situation in the seemingly distant past of no cellphones or
internet where a man hands a woman photographs of his genitals on
the bus, or mails them to her when she ends their relationship. There
is no doubt that society is becoming increasingly dependent upon
technology and digital communication—a 2018 survey indicated that
99% of eighteen- to forty-nine-year-olds in the United States owned
2. Brittany Cox, 14 Women Talk About the Worst Dick Pic They Ever Got (and




3. Natalie Gil, Women Who’ve Been Cyberflashed on Why Dick Pics Are No
Laughing Matter, REFINERY29, https://www.refinery29.com/en-gb/2019/01/222278/
cyberflashing-dick-pics (Feb. 8, 2019, 4:58 PM) [https://perma.cc/N4SC-JQPW].
4. Id.
5. See id.; see also Cox, supra note 2.
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or used a cell phone, while 97% used the internet, and 82% used so-
cial media.6 Wide adoption of online technologies, particularly mobile
platforms, makes it easier and more convenient for individuals to
communicate with social and professional networks. Online communi-
cation is a hallmark of modern life that has become deeply integrated
into most individuals’ daily lives.7 But many forms of online communi-
cation can be less personal and more removed from reality than their
in-person counterparts.8 For example, many people prefer texting
over talking on the phone or in-person conversations, a notion that
would likely be unimaginable in the recent past.9 Moreover, while
traditional forms of communication are primarily used to facilitate
and augment established relationships, many emerging digital plat-
forms also enable and encourage the creation of new connections,
often with no preexisting relationship in the physical world.10 One
need only delve into the world of online dating, video games, and the
like to see just how pervasive meeting and forming relationships with
strangers online is today.11
As is often the case with changing landscapes, these technological
and societal shifts produce many new and intriguing problems. One
particularly relevant issue, as previously illustrated, is the sending of
dick pics from one person to another.12 “Dick pic” is the common
term for a sexually explicit image of male genitals, typically transmit-
ted electronically from a man to a woman.13 Arguably more often
than not, a dick pic sender acts without solicitation.14 This act is called
6. Paul Hitlin, Internet, Social Media Use and Device Ownership in U.S. Have





8. See Neil Howe, Why Millennials Are Texting More and Talking Less, FORBES
(July 15, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/neilhowe/2015/07/15/why-mil
lennials-are-texting-more-and-talking-less/#16f80de45975 [https://perma.cc/RC6Y-
3F6H].
9. Mariel Loveland, Teens Would Rather Text and Chat Online with Their
Friends than Hang Out in Real Life, Study Says, INSIDER (Sept. 12, 2018, 10:30 AM),
https://www.insider.com/study-teens-would-rather-text-with-friends-than-hang-out-in-
real-life-2018-9 [https://perma.cc/R687-Z4RG] (finding 61% of teenagers aged thir-
teen to seventeen in one study preferred communicating via text or social media over
talking to their friends in person).
10. See Ryan Anderson, The Ugly Truth About Online Dating, PSYCH. TODAY
(Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-mating-game/201609/
the-ugly-truth-about-online-dating [https://perma.cc/ESK8-S7QL].
11. Id.
12. See supra quotations accompanying notes 2–4.
13. Dick Pic, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/e/slang/dick-pic/
[https://perma.cc/5D5X-HCDF].
14. See Sue Scheff, The Rise of Uninvited Sexual Images, PSYCH. TODAY (Oct. 12,
2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/shame-nation/201710/the-rise-unin-
vited-sexual-images [https://perma.cc/KU2G-2QKZ].
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“cyber-flashing.”15 Although many individuals voluntarily send or re-
ceive intimate content via photo or video,16 the problem arises when
said content is transmitted without the recipient’s request or consent.
This problem is heightened when considering that much cyber-flash-
ing is perpetrated by someone unknown to the recipient.17 Cyber-
flashers typically transmit these sexually explicit images through pop-
ular online platforms, such as text messages, apps, dating websites,
and social media—where communication with strangers is all but
unavoidable.18
In September 2019, the State of Texas enacted a new law aimed at
addressing this issue.19 Section 21.19 of the Texas Penal Code makes it
a crime to “knowingly transmit[] by electronic means visual material”
that depicts either “any person engaging in sexual conduct or with the
person’s intimate parts exposed” or “covered genitals of a male per-
son that are in a discernibly turgid state” if the material “is not sent at
the request of or with the express consent of the recipient.”20 “Inti-
mate parts” are defined as the “naked genitals, pubic area, anus, but-
tocks, or female nipple of a person.”21 An offense under this statute is
a Class C misdemeanor,22 punishable by a fine of up to $500.23 While
the statute’s language technically includes images of female “intimate
parts,” it focuses mainly on images of male genitalia. Accordingly, this
law has been referred to as the “unsolicited dick pic” or “cyber-flash-
ing” law.24 Although section 21.19 criminalizes certain conduct, con-
senting adults may still freely send intimate sexual material to one
another.25
Section 21.19 reflects increased concern with sexual harassment and
consent issues, particularly online. The statute was enacted in part
through lobbying efforts by Whitney Wolfe Herd, founder and CEO
of Bumble, a dating app that seeks to empower women by giving them
greater control in the matching and communication process.26 Al-
15. Gil, supra note 3.
16. See Sext Much? If So, You’re Not Alone, SCI. AM. (Feb. 4, 2014), https://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/sext-much-if-so-youre-not-alone/ [https://
perma.cc/7BBC-JMFQ].
17. See Gil, supra note 3.
18. See id.
19. Act effective Sept. 1, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., H.B. 2789, § 1 (codified at TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.19).
20. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.19(b).
21. Id. § 21.19(a) (incorporating the definition of “intimate parts” provided in sec-
tion 21.16(a)(1) of the Penal Code); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16(a)(1).
22. PENAL § 21.19(c).
23. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.23.
24. Arwa Mahdawi, Put It Away: Texas Passes Law Banning Dick Pics, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2019/sep/07/texas-passes-law-against-dick-pics-week-in-patriarchy [https://perma.cc/
7KZJ-4BGS].
25. See PENAL § 21.19; Cobler, supra note 1.
26. Cobler, supra note 1.
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though men may fall victim to cyber-flashing, online and digital har-
assment is overwhelmingly targeted toward women.27 In a 2017
survey, 41% of women aged eighteen to thirty-six reported that they
had received at least one unwanted picture of a penis.28 A similar
study found that 53% of millennial women reported receiving dick
pics, and of those women, 78% said the sexual image they received
was unwanted.29 For many women who receive such pictures, espe-
cially from strangers, this conduct can range from merely annoying to
upsetting or frightening.30 In addition, for some victims, the receipt of
unwanted sexual images can be so high in volume or frequency that
their daily lives are negatively affected.31
Women who receive unsolicited, inappropriate pictures through
dating apps or other online platforms previously had limited options
to fight back against the sender, at least in Texas.32 Prior to section
21.19’s enactment (and currently in most other states), the only tangi-
ble repercussions for sending unsolicited nude images was to ban the
content itself or the sender’s account from the particular platform
used.33 In an overt effort to combat cyber-flashing, some platforms are
exploring and introducing artificial intelligence (“AI”) technology to
screen for nudity.34 One woman is developing a screening technology
called safeDM, which she intends to launch as a free service for Twit-
27. Researcher Discusses ‘Unjust Burden’ Put on Women by Online Harassment,
CITY UNIV. OF LONDON (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.city.ac.uk/news/2018/october/on
line-abuse-and-harassment-research [https://perma.cc/NBH8-GFA5] [hereinafter Re-
searcher Discusses ‘Unjust Burden’].
28. Anna North, One State Has Banned Unsolicited Dick Pics. Will It Fix the Prob-
lem?, VOX (Sept. 3, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/3/
20847447/unsolicited-dick-pics-texas-law-harassment [https://perma.cc/V6WF-
ASWP].
29. Scheff, supra note 14; see also New Texas Laws: Illegal to Send Unsolicited
Nude Photos, FOX 4 NEWS (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.fox4news.com/news/new-
texas-laws-illegal-to-send-unsolicited-nude-photos [https://perma.cc/7EXY-RZ82]
[hereinafter New Texas Laws].
30. See David J. Ley, Why Men Send Pics of Their Junk, PSYCH. TODAY (Feb. 18,
2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/women-who-stray/201602/why-men-
send-pics-their-junk [https://perma.cc/U65H-YME9].
31. See Irene Cruz, Texas Outlawed Unsolicited Nude Pictures, Legal Experts Call
Law ‘Unconstitutional’, NEWS4SA (Sept. 19, 2019), https://news4sanantonio.com/
news/local/texas-outlawed-unsolicited-nude-pictures-legal-experts-call-law-unconstitu
tional [https://perma.cc/4E32-69DV].
32. Dan Solomon, Texas May Outlaw Unsolicited Sexual Images. Would That Be
Enforceable—and Does It Even Matter?, TEX. MONTHLY (Mar. 28, 2019), https://
www.texasmonthly.com/news/texas-may-outlaw-unsolicited-sexual-images-would-
that-be-enforceable-and-does-it-even-matter/ [https://perma.cc/9A4Q-JCNH].
33. Id.; Issie Lapowsky, How Would NYC’s Anti-AirDrop Dick Pic Law Even
Work?, WIRED (Dec. 3, 2018, 4:50 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/nyc-anti-air-
drop-dick-pic-law/ [https://perma.cc/3M6D-ET6N].
34. Brittany Wong, A California Lawmaker Wants to Fine Those Who Send Un-
wanted Dick Pics, HUFFPOST (Dec. 2, 2019, 5:52 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/en
try/unsolicited-nude-photo-law_l_5ddd9eb2e4b0913e6f7566d6 [https://perma.cc/
75ZR-XZL7]; Kelsey Bressler, I’m Asking Men to Send Me Dick Pics to Create a
Solution to Cyberflashing, HUFFPOST (Nov. 15, 2019, 10:19 AM), https://www.huffing
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ter users.35 SafeDM is a filter that uses AI to monitor a user’s
messages for incoming photos, identifies photos that contain penises,
and automatically deletes them.36 Bumble has also implemented an
AI system that has the ability to recognize most explicit photos sent
through direct messages.37 The app alerts users who receive such
photos by blurring them and then enabling the recipient to view or
delete the image.38 Users can also choose to report the sender.39 Such
extensive efforts to prevent and place consequences on cyber-flashing
indicate that it is a significant and widespread concern for many users
of online platforms. Under section 21.19, Texas has become one of the
first states to recognize these concerns in a significant way, and now
provides legal recourse for cyber-flashing victims.40
Bumble CEO Wolfe Herd conceptualized section 21.19, saying that
“it feels like men and women are being told that this increasingly com-
mon problem is really no big deal.”41 She approached Texas House
Representative Morgan Meyer to create legislation that would help
reign in a previously unchecked type of sexual harassment,42 address-
ing the “growing problem of aggressive and unsolicited sexual com-
munication online.”43 Wolfe Herd believes the digital world “is
basically a society with no rules,” and many proponents of the law
view cyber-flashing as a technology-based form of sexual harassment
that should be punished.44 Many women also see it as a form of intimi-
dating and threatening sexual violence,45 a fact which carries legal sig-
nificance.46 While punishment is one goal of section 21.19, deterrence
is another.47 Section 21.19 operates like “sin taxes” on alcohol and
cigarettes, in that the law aims to discourage people from engaging in
tonpost.co.uk/entry/cyberflashing-revenge-porn_uk_5dce6dcce4b0d2e79f8a785f
[https://perma.cc/NGH7-ZY44].
35. Bressler, supra note 34.
36. Id.
37. Wong, supra note 34.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.19.
41. Troy Closson, A New Texas Law Criminalizes Sending Unwanted Nudes. Law-




43. Cobler, supra note 1.
44. Rachel Hosie, Sending Unsolicited Dick Pics Is Now Illegal in Texas, and
Could Result in a $500 Fine, INSIDER (Sept. 3, 2019, 8:32 AM), https://www.insider.
com/unsolicited-dick-pic-sending-now-illegal-texas-500-fine-bumble-2019-9 [https://
perma.cc/62CW-6T9M].
45. See Ley, supra note 30; see generally Charlotte Palermino, The Airdropped
Dick Pic Epidemic Is upon Us, ELLE (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.elle.com/culture/
tech/a19549140/the-airdropped-dickpic-epidemic-is-upon-us/ [https://perma.cc/2ARX-
F6FA].
46. See discussion infra Section II.B.
47. Closson, supra note 41.
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behavior that “violates the norms of what [society] think[s] is
proper.”48 Getting the law involved is a way of “shaping norms to get
this behavior taken more seriously.”49 Ultimately, Texas has enacted
section 21.19 not only to place consequences on sending unsolicited
sexual images but primarily to prevent such behavior in the first
place.50
Although Texas is one of the first states to enact a cyber-flashing
law, other states, cities, and countries are considering or have enacted
similar legislation.51 In South Carolina, it is against the law to “anony-
mously send any lewd content without the consent of the person re-
ceiving it.”52 A California lawmaker introduced a similar bill into the
California Senate in January 2020, with the help and inspiration of
Bumble and Wolfe Herd’s success in Texas.53 Additionally, a similar
bill proposed in New York City would criminalize “send[ing] an unso-
licited sexually explicit video or image to another person with intent
to harass, annoy or alarm such other person.”54 This bill was intro-
duced as a response to commuters being cyber-flashed via their
phones’ AirDrop feature when in close proximity to others on public
transportation.55 Cyber-flashing legislation across the United States
and other countries reflects widespread concern in combatting the
growing issue of cyber-flashing and the government’s strong interest
in addressing it.
While there is ample support for the general goals and rationale
behind section 21.19, some legal scholars believe the law will face First
Amendment challenges.56 Section 21.19 certainly appears to straddle
the line between free speech protections and the government’s inter-
est in combatting sexual harassment and addressing consent issues in
an online era. While the government has a significant interest in pro-
48. Solomon, supra note 32.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See Rachel Thompson, It’s Time to Stop Saying ‘Unsolicited Dick Pics.’ Here’s
Why., MASHABLE (July 19, 2019), https://mashable.com/article/cyberflashing-unsolic-
ited-dick-pics-terminology/ [https://perma.cc/Y5XN-LYEM]; see also Cara Curtis, The
UK Government Is Looking to Criminalize Unsolicited Dick Pics, THE NEXT WEB
(Mar. 7, 2019), https://thenextweb.com/tech/2019/03/07/uk-government-looking-to-
criminalize-unsolicited-dick-pics/ [https://perma.cc/W547-G9W9].
52. New Texas Laws, supra note 29.
53. Press Release, Ling Ling Chang, Sen., California’s 29th Senate District, Sena-
tor Chang Introduces Legislation to Outlaw Cyber-Flashing in Collaboration with
Bumble (Jan. 7, 2020), https://chang.cssrc.us/content/senator-chang-introduces-legisla
tion-outlaw-cyber-flashing-collaboration-bumble [https://perma.cc/253F-7Y7C].
54. N.Y.C. Council Int. No. 1244 (2018), https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/Legisla
tionDetail.aspx?ID=3763643&GUID=F06C28F9-16D1-4DDA-82D7-372C94B8E84D
[https://perma.cc/B6H5-TEXE] (quoting bill summary); North, supra note 28.
55. See North, supra note 28.
56. Most critics argue that the law is potentially overbroad and vague because it
could criminalize behavior that is protected by the First Amendment. See Solomon,
supra note 32; Cruz, supra note 31; Cobler, supra note 1; Closson, supra note 41.
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tecting First Amendment rights, it has a similar, if not greater interest
in preventing sexual harassment and sexual violence, including fear of
physical and sexual assault—which many cyber-flashing victims expe-
rience.57 But there may be a way to strike a balance between protect-
ing free speech and preventing threatening conduct—the true threat
doctrine.
This Article examines Texas Penal Code section 21.19 under the
First Amendment’s free speech guarantee. Part II examines indecency
as constitutionally protected speech, but with reduced protection in
circumstances characterized by a lack of consent or an additional
threat element, particularly focusing on indecent exposure and exam-
ining cyber-flashing as its functional equivalent. Part II also introduces
“true threats” as a category of constitutionally unprotected speech
and argues that statutory “affront or alarm” requirements in indecent
exposure laws are a practical application of the true threat doctrine.
Part III applies the true threat doctrine to section 21.19 by arguing
that cyber-flashing encompasses a threat element, and ultimately con-
cludes that section 21.19 is therefore constitutional. Finally, Part IV
alternatively recommends amending section 21.19 to include an “af-
front or alarm” requirement to better ensure compliance with First
Amendment protections while still effectuating the statute’s goals.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE TRUE THREAT DOCTRINE
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”58 Similarly, the Texas Constitution protects the “liberty to
speak, write or publish . . . opinions on any subject.”59 Although the
First Amendment is stated in absolute terms, there are certain con-
texts where the government may regulate speech.60 Even so, the Su-
preme Court has said that “[i]f the First Amendment means anything,
it means that regulating speech must be a last—not first—resort.”61
A. Indecency
Sexually explicit material is typically considered indecent speech
under the First Amendment,62 which generally protects indecency, at
57. See generally Palermino, supra note 45.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
59. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8.
60. VICTORIA L. KILLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CATE-
GORIES OF SPEECH (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11072.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PN3W-3C2V].
61. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
62. David L. Hudson, Jr., Pornography & Obscenity, FREEDOM F. INST., https://
www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/
adult-entertainment/pornography-obscenity/ [https://perma.cc/A4JR-NEQ4].
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least where it involves adults.63 The Supreme Court has “made it per-
fectly clear that ‘[s]exual expression which is indecent . . . is protected
by the First Amendment.’”64 While certain speech may be offensive
or undesirable to society, that fact alone cannot justify its
suppression.65
However, while still considered protected speech, indecency is
sometimes subject to reduced First Amendment protection.66 The
government may regulate some categories of speech because of their
content, but only where the speech is “of such slight social value . . .
that any benefit that may be derived . . . is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.”67 Both content and context are
important elements in such a First Amendment analysis.68 The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly held that not all protected speech is
equal—and has been willing to place some constitutional limits on cer-
tain categories of speech, including indecency.69 For example, the
Court has upheld many indecency regulations that aim to protect chil-
dren from exposure to sexually explicit material.70 Courts have also
upheld indecency regulations in the context of nudity, particularly in
situations where there is a potential risk of exposure to the public.71
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, a Supreme Court plurality upheld an In-
diana statute prohibiting public indecency related to nude dancing.72
The Court determined that while dancing may typically have First
Amendment protection because of its expressive quality, the nude
dancing in this case did not, because the statute targeted the physical
63. See Ruth Ann Strickland, Indecency and the Electronic Media, THE FIRST
AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/971/inde
cency-and-the-electronic-media (July 2017) [https://perma.cc/F7UE-E2GJ]. But see
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749–51 (1978) (holding that indecent material in
the context of broadcasting which has a reasonable risk of reaching children is subject
to First Amendment restrictions).
64. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (quoting Sable Commc’ns of Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
65. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l,
431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977).
66. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
67. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992) (quoting Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
68. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 744 (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919)).
69. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567; Non-Obscene but Sexually Explicit and Indecent
Expression., LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/
amendment-1/non-obscene-but-sexually-explicit-and-indecent-expression [https://
perma.cc/9DAU-LNB3].
70. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 887 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 750; see generally Amicus Brief of
the American Center for Law & Justice in Support of Neither Party, FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239 (2012) [hereinafter Amicus Brief] (No. 10-
1293), 2011 WL 4100441.
71. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567–68.
72. Id. at 572.
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act of nudity “whether or not it [was] combined with expressive activ-
ity.”73 The Supreme Court has held that when conduct consists of both
speech and nonspeech elements, a sufficiently important governmen-
tal interest sometimes “justif[ies] incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms.”74 The Court analyzed the Indiana statute
under the O’Brien test, which permits governmental regulation of
speech by laws that impact expressive conduct, i.e., conduct that con-
tains both speech and nonspeech elements.75 The test holds that gov-
ernmental regulation is sufficiently justified under the following
circumstances:
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmen-
tal interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.76
The Court emphasized the notion that statutes regulating indecency
are designed to “protect morals and public order,” and that such regu-
lation, despite its potential to restrict expressive quality, furthers a
substantial and legitimate government interest in achieving these
goals.77 While sexually explicit, nude conduct is typically protected
“within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment,” the Court ex-
pressed that it is “only marginally so,”78 indicating that it is subject to
reduced First Amendment protection.
1. Reduced Protection for Unsolicited Indecency
With already reduced protection for some forms of indecency,
courts are additionally willing to uphold regulations that address acts
of foisting unsolicited or unconsented-to indecent material or speech
on another person. This type of regulation centers around consent.
While indecency and sexual harassment—which many, including
lawmakers, view cyber-flashing as79—are not necessarily related con-
cepts, they often overlap when a lack of consent is involved. Consent
is a key issue in the current dialogue of sexually related conduct80 and
one that state governments consider increasingly important.81 This in-
73. Id. at 561.
74. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
75. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566–67.
76. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
77. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 569.
78. Id. at 566.
79. Sharon Otterman, Sending Lewd Nudes to Strangers Could Mean a Year in
Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/30/nyregion/air-
drop-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/8S2F-AYUN].
80. Judith Shulevitz, Regulating Sex, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/opinion/sunday/judith-shulevitz-regulating-sex.html
[https://perma.cc/E5WF-XBNR].
81. For example, concern with consent is illustrated by states’ growing adoption of
affirmative consent requirements in sexual assault statutes. Id.; see also Noah Hilgert,
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creased concern reflects the government’s strong interest in protecting
individuals from unwanted and unsolicited sexual conduct, whether it
be physical, verbal, or visual.
Regulation of unsolicited sexually explicit material and conduct is
thus permitted in several contexts. For instance, Title VII and Title IX
prohibit unwanted, uninvited sexual harassment and discrimination in
the workplace and public education systems.82 Under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, sexual harassment is considered prohibited
discrimination.83 “Unwelcome sexual advances . . . and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
[the] conduct explicitly or implicitly affects an individual’s employ-
ment . . . or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environ-
ment.”84 Under this definition, any uninvited or unconsented-to
sexually related speech—including sexually oriented pictures85—that
affects an individual’s employment or negatively impacts her is consid-
ered sexual harassment and thus violates Title VII.86 Similarly, Title
IX prohibits sex-based discrimination in public education programs.87
Supreme Court decisions have extended Title IX’s protection to cover
a broad scope of behavior, including unwelcomed verbal, visual, and
physical sexual conduct.88 While Title VII and Title IX are concerned
with speech in specific contexts, they nonetheless reflect the govern-
ment’s willingness to regulate speech regarding unsolicited sexual be-
havior and material.
Additionally, the federal government has already placed some lim-
its on unsolicited indecent speech transmitted via online communica-
tion. Congress enacted the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (“CAN-SPAM”) to address
the emerging issue of commercial email spam containing unsolicited
The Burden of Consent: Due Process and the Emerging Adoption of the Affirmative
Consent Standard in Sexual Assault Laws, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 867, 889–90 (2016).
82. See Title IX of Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901(a), 86 Stat. 235, 373 (1972) (codified
as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255–57 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Facts About Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Jan. 15, 1997) https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-
sex.cfm [https://perma.cc/C3JH-KZ3R].
84. Facts About Sexual Harassment, supra note 83.
85. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-1990-8, POLICY GUI-
DANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1990), https://www.eeoc.gov/
laws/guidance/policy-guidance-current-issues-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/
7VB5-BEJV]; see Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 572–73
(W.D.N.Y. 1987).
86. See § 2000e-2(a)(1).
87. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
88. OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS,
OR THIRD PARTIES 2 & 24–25 n.6 (2001), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
docs/shguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJV2-2ZMK].
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sexually explicit material.89 CAN-SPAM mandates that senders of
commercial email containing sexually oriented material place warning
labels in the subject line or in the message itself before the content can
be viewed, unless the recipient has given prior affirmative consent to
receiving the message.90 The Federal Trade Commission also requires
that any commercial email messages containing sexually explicit mate-
rial be labeled “SEXUALLY-EXPLICIT” in a clear and conspicuous
manner.91 And when a recipient requests that she not receive some or
all communications from the sender, the sender must cease such com-
munications promptly within ten business days.92 These mandates put
recipients of indecent material on notice and allow them to avoid
viewing sexually explicit material without their consent.93
In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court recognized that states
have a “legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition
of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a
significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipi-
ents.”94 The Court examined whether Marvin Miller’s mass mailing of
sexually explicit brochures violated a California statute by knowingly
distributing obscene material.95 The distributed brochures contained
images and drawings of men and women with their genitals displayed
and engaged in various sexual acts.96 Miller mailed the brochures to
recipients without their request or consent.97 The recipients also did
not express desire to receive the materials.98 Although the Miller
Court addressed obscenity—an unprotected category of speech99—
rather than indecency, it nonetheless generally condemned the trans-
mission of unsolicited sexually explicit material to nonconsenting indi-
viduals.100 However, the majority criticized and rejected Justice
Brennan’s dissenting suggestion that suppression of unprotected ob-
scene material should be permissible by statute to prohibit exposure
to minors and nonconsenting adults.101 The Court reasoned there was
no way to more clearly draw the line between protected and unpro-
tected materials under a consent standard than for regulation of com-
89. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, §§ 2(a)(1)–(3), 5(d)(1)–(2), 117 Stat. 2699, 2699, 2709–10
(2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701(a)(1)–(3), 7704(d)(1)–(2)).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 7704(d)(1)–(2).
91. CAN-SPAM Act: A Compliance Guide for Business, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/
tips-advice/business-center/guidance/can-spam-act-compliance-guide-business [https://
perma.cc/C94T-BCKG].
92. Id.; § 7704(a)(4)(A).
93. CAN-SPAM Act: A Compliance Guide for Business, supra note 91.
94. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18–19 (1973).
95. See id. at 16–18.
96. Id. at 18.
97. Id. at 17–18.
98. Id. at 18.
99. Id. at 23, 36–37.
100. Id. at 17–19.
101. Id. at 27; see id. at 47–48 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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mercial exposure to consenting adults only.102 Although the Court
rejected Justice Brennan’s statutory consent argument, both the ma-
jority and Justice Brennan’s dissent implied a general governmental
interest in protecting nonconsenting adults from exposure to un-
wanted sexually explicit material.103
2. Indecent Exposure: Even Further Reduced Protection for
Unsolicited Indecency with an Additional Threat Element
Courts often uphold statutory limits on indecent behavior in the
context of indecent exposure laws. Most indecent exposure statutes
target public or in-person exposure.104 At their most basic level, inde-
cency statutes “reflect moral disapproval of people appearing in the
nude.”105 Indecent exposure statutes capture this concept, while also
encompassing a fear or threat-based rationale. Scholars argue that the
law forbids indecent exposure because of fears that the exposer will
move on to a sexual or physical assault due to physical proximity be-
tween the perpetrator and the victim.106 Physical safety concerns relat-
ing to indecent exposure are significant.107 For example, individuals
who experience crimes related to or posing a potential threat of sexual
violence, such as receiving obscene phone calls or indecent exposure,
elicit high levels of fear responses.108 Victims of indecent exposure re-
port feeling that indecent exposers are dangerous and that the experi-
ence is distressing.109
Indecent exposure is a punishable crime in all fifty states and the
District of Columbia.110 In Texas, it is prohibited by Penal Code sec-
tion 21.08.111 The statute makes it a crime when a person “exposes his
anus or any part of his genitals with intent to arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, and he is reckless about whether another
is present who will be offended or alarmed by his act.”112 Indecent
exposure is a Class B misdemeanor113 and is punishable by a fine of
up to $2,000, jail confinement for up to 180 days, or both.114 The statu-
102. Id. at 27 (majority opinion).
103. Id. at 18–19, 27; see id. at 47–48 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. See Amicus Brief, supra note 70.
105. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 568 (1991).
106. Sharon Riordan, Indecent Exposure: The Impact upon the Victim’s Fear of Sex-
ual Crime, 10 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCH. 309, 313–15 (1999).
107. Hannah Scott, Stranger Danger: Explaining Women’s Fear of Crime, 4 W.
CRIMINOLOGY REV. 203, 204 (2003).
108. Id.
109. See Riordan, supra note 106, at 312.
110. See Amicus Brief, supra note 70; see also Nudity and Public Decency Laws in
America, HG.ORG, https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/nudity-and-public-decency-laws-
in-america-31193 [https://perma.cc/GF5P-YZRW].
111. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.08(a).
112. Id.
113. Id. § 21.08(b).
114. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.22.
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tory requirement of “any person” is met when the defendant acted
with the intent to arouse or gratify his own sexual desires.115 Addition-
ally, the indecent exposure need not occur in public. In Young v. State,
a Texas court of appeals concluded that the defendant only had to act
recklessly: a defendant commits indecent exposure “when he is aware
of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that
another individual would see and be alarmed or offended by his expo-
sure.116 Section 21.08 “does not expressly require that the State prove
[the defendant] exposed himself in a public place; it merely requires
the State to prove he recklessly exposed himself to another.”117
Many state indecent exposure statutes have been upheld as consti-
tutional, including section 21.08.118 In Kew v. Senter, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas relied on Miller and
the O’Brien test in concluding that statutes regulating indecent expo-
sure like section 21.08 are primarily directed at nonverbal, physical
conduct—conduct that Texas has a greater interest and ability in regu-
lating than purely expressive speech.119 While the plaintiff’s nudity
may or may not have consisted of expressive content, section 21.08
primarily targets physical conduct and thus only incidentally impacts
speech.120 The court reasoned that “it is difficult to conceive of ideas
entitled to First Amendment protection which can be solely or even
best expressed by baring the anus or genitals in the circumstances for-
bidden by the statute[].”121 By holding that regulation of indecent ex-
posure is “certainly [an] area[] of respectable and substantial
governmental interest,”122 the court solidified regulation of indecent
sexually explicit behavior as an important and substantial interest of
the Texas government—one in which Texas has the power not only to
punish conduct, but to prohibit it.
In considering both indecent exposure and cyber-flashing, the ques-
tion is whether transmitting images of genitals over a digital device
without solicitation is different from physically exposing one’s genitals
without solicitation—and if so, how? Legally and practically, cyber-
flashing is a functional equivalent of indecent exposure. The most ob-
vious, and potentially only, significant difference is that indecent ex-
posure occurs in person, while sending unsolicited sexually explicit
images occurs via technology. Some scholars argue that while indecent
115. Cate v. State, 124 S.W.3d 922, 931 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, pet. ref’d) (per
curiam); Malcolm v. State, No. 05-17-01488-CR, 2019 WL 2521717, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Dallas June 19, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
116. Young v. State, 976 S.W.2d 771, 774 (Tex. App—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet.
ref’d) (quoting and applying the definition of “reckless” provided in TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 6.03(c)).
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. See Kew v. Senter, 416 F. Supp. 1101, 1104–05 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
119. Id. at 1104.
120. Id. at 1105.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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exposure stems from concerns of physical assault, when exposure is
virtual, this risk is much lower, if not non-existent.123 For example,
public nudity may be “viscerally perceived as real and immediate in a
way that a video [or visual image] is not.”124 But what if exposure
occurs both through virtual means and within physical proximity, as in
cases where cyber-flashing is perpetrated through AirDrop?125
State courts are beginning to see litigation regarding the digital
transmission of sexually explicit images and whether this conduct con-
stitutes indecent exposure. In State v. Legassie, Maine’s highest court
concluded that Andrew Legassie’s transmission of “explicit digital
images” of his exposed genitals did not qualify as indecent expo-
sure.126 Legassie was prosecuted under section 854(1)(B) of Maine’s
indecent conduct statute, which makes it a crime when, “in a private
place, the actor exposes the actor’s genitals with the intent that the
actor be seen from a public place or from another private place.”127
Section 854(1)(A)(2) of the same statute makes it a crime when, in
public, an actor “knowingly exposes the actor’s genitals under circum-
stances that in fact are likely to cause affront or alarm.”128 While sec-
tion 854(1)(B), under which Legassie was prosecuted, contains no
“affront or alarm” requirement for the victim,129 the in-public provi-
sion of the same statute does.130 The court ultimately determined that
Legassie’s conduct was not indecent exposure because the record con-
tained “no evidence of any in-person contact that formed the basis of
the alleged crimes”131 and because that interpretation of the statute
would “criminalize private behavior between consenting adults.”132
The court expressed concern that criminalizing exposure through digi-
tal means under section 854(1)(B) would “present serious constitu-
tional problems because [it] contains no ‘affront or alarm’
requirement.”133 Although the alleged cyber-flashing did not qualify
as indecent exposure,134 the court’s holding indicates that Legassie’s
123. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Re-
ality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1077 (2018).
124. Id.
125. See discussion infra Section III.B.
126. State v. Legassie, 171 A.3d 589, 591, 596 (Me. 2017).
127. Id. at 592; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 854(1)(B) (West 2006) (emphasis
added).
128. § 854(1)(A)(2).
129. Id. § 854(1)(B).
130. Id. § 854(1)(A)(2).
131. Legassie, 171 A.3d at 591–92.
132. Id. at 596; see also Eugene Volokh, Sending Nude Selfies Doesn’t Qualify as




133. Legassie, 171 A.3d at 596.
134. Id.
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conduct would likely have qualified if the statute contained an “af-
front or alarm” element.
Most indecent exposure statutes contain “affront or alarm” lan-
guage.135 While section 21.19 contains a non-consent requirement, it
lacks an “affront or alarm” element.136 Section 21.19 has been criti-
cized as unconstitutional as is, but would a Texas court find that send-
ing unsolicited sexually explicit material to another person qualifies as
indecent exposure, if section 21.19 had an “affront or alarm” require-
ment? Based on Legassie, it appears so. However, some courts have
upheld indecent exposure statutes with non-consent requirements
alone, which would work in section 21.19’s favor without alteration.137
In Legassie, the court indicated that the constitutionality of Maine’s
indecent exposure statute hinged on the presence of an “affront or
alarm” requirement.138 Thus, “affront or alarm” requirements are a
way that indecent exposure statutes—and potentially similar stat-
utes—can survive First Amendment challenges. For example, New
York City’s proposed cyber-flashing bill criminalizes cyber-flashing
committed “with intent to harass, annoy or alarm” the recipient.139
The current landscape of indecent exposure law in Texas and else-
where has significant implications for cyber-flashing. As discussed,
cyber-flashing is essentially equivalent to indecent exposure, albeit in
an online rather than in-person format. Application of section 21.08
shows that Texas courts are willing to extend indecent exposure law to
its outer limits. Because they have held that indecent exposure need
not necessarily take place in public, cyber-flashing could very well fall
near, if not within, the parameters of our current understanding of
indecent exposure jurisprudence. Outcomes such as these illustrate
courts’ broad interest in prohibiting indecent exposure and beg the
question of whether cyber-flashing is a form of indecent exposure that
can, and should, be regulated as such.
Ultimately, the similarities between cyber-flashing and indecent ex-
posure are difficult to ignore. Whitney Wolfe Herd compared the two
in a hearing with the Texas House Criminal Jurisprudence Committee
when lobbying for section 21.19’s enactment: “If indecent exposure is
a crime on the streets, then why is it not on your phone or com-
puter?”140 Additionally, Representative Morgan Meyer argued that
“if a person commits indecent exposure, it is a crime. . . . But if that
same person engages in such an act over texting or a dating app, the
135. See Amicus Brief, supra note 70, app. at 1a–76a.
136. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.19.
137. See State v. Galbreath, 419 P.2d 800, 802–03 (Wash. 1966).
138. See Legassie, 171 A.3d at 595–96.
139. N.Y.C. Council Int. No. 1244 (2018), https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/Legisla-
tionDetail.aspx?ID=3763643&GUID=F06C28F9-16D1-4DDA-82D7-372C94B8E84D
[https://perma.cc/B6H5-TEXE] (quoting bill summary).
140. Cobler, supra note 1.
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unwanting recipient has absolutely no recourse.”141 Thus, lawmakers
introduced section 21.19 to provide such recourse with the view that
cyber-flashing is a form of online indecent exposure that should be
punishable and preventable by law—just like its physical counterpart.
B. The True Threat Doctrine
While most categories of speech are either protected or subject to
reduced protection, some categories do not fall within the First
Amendment’s protection at all.142 One category is “true threats.”143
The true threat doctrine permits the government to enforce regula-
tions of, and prohibit, speech that conveys threats of violence against
an individual.144 A true threat exists when the speaker “means to com-
municate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlaw-
ful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”145 A
speaker need not intend to actually carry out the threat; the true
threat exception is meant to protect the listener from fear of vio-
lence.146 The speaker must only intentionally or knowingly communi-
cate the threat.147 Intimidation is a type of true threat that is not
protected by the First Amendment, wherein a speaker directs a threat
toward another person with the “intent of placing the victim in fear of
bodily harm or death.”148 States may prohibit intimidating behavior so
long as it is not criminalized solely on the basis that society finds it
offensive.149 The Supreme Court has set forth three reasons why the
First Amendment does not protect threats of violence: to protect indi-
viduals “from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear en-
genders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur.”150 True threat litigation has increased in recent years, with
many threats arising from social media and the internet.151
As previously discussed, most indecent exposure statutes contain an
“affront or alarm” element.152 Because these statutory requirements
serve to prevent and punish lewd behavior that alarms or offends a
victim, “affront or alarm” requirements are in effect practical applica-
tions of the true threat doctrine. Victims who are alarmed by indecent
141. Id.
142. KILLION, supra note 60.
143. Id.; Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
144. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 359–60; Ana Vieira Ayala, Hate Speech Is Free Speech but Free Speech Is
Not Absolute, 81 TEX. BAR J. 330, 330 (2018).
147. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
148. Id. at 360.
149. Id. at 358.
150. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
151. Alison J. Best, Elonis v. United States: The Need to Uphold Individual Rights
to Free Speech While Protecting Victims of Online True Threats, 75 MD. L. REV. 1127,
1127 (2016); David L. Hudson, Jr., Threatening Words, 104 A.B.A. J. 56, 57 (2018).
152. See Amicus Brief, supra note 70, app. at 1a–76a.
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exposure often fear physical harm by the offender—and thus feel that
the act is a potential threat of violence. Some indecent exposure stat-
utes even contain an explicit threat element.153 For example, in
Alaska, a person commits indecent exposure in the second degree
when he knowingly exposes his genitals “with reckless disregard for
the . . . frightening effect the act may have.”154 An indecent exposer
placing an individual in fear of violence by alarming or affronting her
is exactly the type of conduct the true threat doctrine aims to prevent.
Indecent exposure can be regulated by the government, both statuto-
rily and constitutionally—because the First Amendment does not pro-
tect threats of violence.155
III. APPLYING THE TRUE THREAT DOCTRINE TO SECTION 21.19
A. The True Threat Intent Standard in an Online Era
Because section 21.19 criminalizes behavior, an individual must
have the statute’s requisite mens rea to be convicted of cyber-flashing.
Criminal laws require that a defendant act with a minimum level of
intent.156 Statutes generally contain either a specific (or subjective)
intent or a general intent standard.157 If criminal statutes do not ex-
plicitly mandate a level of intent and carry the risk of criminalizing
innocent behavior, courts interpreting them should infer a required
subjective intent.158 Section 21.19 requires only that a person “know-
ingly transmits” a sexually explicit image to another person159—so
what is the intent standard when viewing section 21.19 under a true
threat theory?
For true threats, a general intent standard requires only that a rea-
sonable person would interpret a communication as a threat.160 A spe-
cific intent standard requires that the speaker intended the
communication as a threat or that he should have foreseen his com-
munication would be viewed as one.161 Circuits are split on what in-
tent standard to use for true threat analysis.162 Despite a general lack
of explicit intent requirements in true threat-applicable statutes, most
circuits favor a general intent, or reasonable listener test, while a few
circuits have adopted a specific intent or reasonable speaker test.163
The Fifth Circuit—and Texas courts—utilize a reasonable listener
153. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.460 (2018).
154. Id.
155. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
156. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952).
157. See id. at 252; see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 423 n.5 (1985);
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994).
158. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425–26; Staples, 511 U.S. at 605–06.
159. TEXAS PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.19(b).
160. Best, supra note 151, at 1132.
161. See id. at 1132–33, 1156.
162. Id. at 1140.
163. Id. at 1140–41.
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standard.164 Under a reasonable listener standard, the speaker need
not intend his speech to be an expression of violence—the only re-
quirement is that a reasonable listener understands the speech to be a
threat.165
In Elonis v. United States, the Supreme Court missed an opportu-
nity to address an intent requirement for true threats, particularly in
regard to online communication.166 The Court examined Anthony
Elonis’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for making true threats
on Facebook to his ex-wife, his former co-workers, law enforcement
officers, elementary school children, and an FBI agent.167 A person
commits a felony and may be imprisoned for up to five years under
§ 875(c) if he “transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any com-
munication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat
to injure the person of another.”168 The statute “prohibits the commu-
nication of true threats to speech transmitted through online social
networking.”169 The statute requires both that a communication is
transmitted and that it contains a threat, but does not specify a partic-
ular intent requirement.170 Elonis’s Facebook posts consisted of vio-
lent rap lyrics, which appeared targeted at certain individuals.171
Elonis claimed that his statements online were “therapeutic” and al-
lowed him to express his feelings, but were not directed at any real
persons.172 However, Elonis’s ex-wife and co-workers considered his
online posts genuine threats and testified that they were afraid of
him.173 Elonis was convicted in the district court on four of five counts
and appealed on the basis that the jury instructions should have re-
quired a finding that he actually intended his Facebook posts to be
true threats.174
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals declined application of a sub-
jective intent standard and instead determined that the proper stan-
dard was “the intent to communicate words that the defendant
understands, and that a reasonable person would view as a threat.”175
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the appropriate in-
tent standard for a true threat under § 875(c),176 and ultimately re-
164. See Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616–17 (5th Cir. 2004).
165. Best, supra note 151, at 1140–41.
166. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
167. Id. at 2004–07.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c); Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008; see 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(5) (classi-
fying statutes with max imprisonment terms of less than five years but more than one
year as a felony).
169. Best, supra note 151, at 1128; see also Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008.
170. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008.
171. Id. at 2005–07.
172. Id. at 2005.
173. Id. at 2007.
174. Id.
175. Id. (summarizing the lower court’s decision).
176. United States v. Elonis, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (mem.) (granting certiorari).
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versed the Third Circuit’s decision, holding that some level of intent
beyond general intent was required to convict Elonis.177 The Court
held that it was not sufficient that a reasonable person would have
viewed Elonis’s Facebook posts as threats because this level of intent
may result in criminalizing innocent conduct.178 Citing precedent, the
Court broadly construed the statute to require a more specific level of
intent, even though the statute was silent on the matter.179 However,
the Court failed to specify a definite standard beyond general intent
that was necessary for conviction under § 875(c).180 Additionally, the
Court ruled narrowly, limiting its holding to application of § 875(c),
and declined to address any First Amendment issues.181 In doing so,
the Court failed to clarify a definitive intent standard for true threats
generally.182
Because the Elonis Court failed to set out a concrete, universal
standard, lower courts will likely continue to use different intent stan-
dards in interpreting true threats under First Amendment analysis, es-
pecially in regard to online communication and social media.183 The
leniency of the intent requirement for true threats will likely work in
section 21.19’s favor and allow for the statute to apply to a broader
range of cyber-flashing cases, at least until (or if) the Supreme Court
revisits the issue. Because the Fifth Circuit and Texas courts use a gen-
eral intent, or reasonable listener standard, many individuals who
send unsolicited explicit photos likely meet the true threat intent stan-
dard, whether or not they actually intend the images to threaten or
intimidate the recipient. Under the true threat doctrine, Texas courts
analyzing section 21.19 need only find that the sender intentionally
sent an unsolicited explicit image and that a recipient reasonably felt
threatened or intimidated by it.
B. Crossing the Line: Cyber-Flashing as a Threat
Recipients of unsolicited and unconsented-to explicit sexual images
report feeling a variety of emotions: disgust, humor, pity, sadness.184
Some feel indifferent. But many feel angry, intruded upon, and vio-
177. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2009–10.
180. Best, supra note 151, at 1144.
181. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012–13.
182. See id.; see id. at 2013–14 (Alito, J., concurring).
183. Best, supra note 151, at 1128.
184. Simon Doherty, This Study Reveals Some Embarrassing Truths About Dick
Pic Senders, VICE (Aug. 1, 2019, 6:50 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/
qv7ggv/dick-pics-why-men-send [https://perma.cc/3TXN-M2MV]; Sophie Gallagher,
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lated.185 Many victims are genuinely upset by cyber-flashing and feel
that it compromises their privacy.186 But where does cyber-flashing
cross the line from being merely an annoyance or upsetting to being
an actual or perceived threat?
One increasingly common situation where recipients of unsolicited
explicit images feel unsafe, unsettled, and even threatened occurs
when they are cyber-flashed via AirDrop in public places.187 AirDrop
is a feature on iPhones and other Apple products that allows a user to
instantly send or receive photos and other content to and from other
Apple users who are physically close.188 AirDrop enables the transfer
of information using Wi-Fi and Bluetooth.189 When an image is sent
via AirDrop, a preview window appears on the recipient’s phone or
device.190 Anyone with the AirDrop feature turned “on” and set to
“everyone” will receive a notification if he or she is within thirty feet
of the sender and the sender chooses to send an image to his or her
phone.191 Because of the preview feature, there is no way to decline or
reject an image before the recipient views it.192 Another characteristic
of AirDrop is that a sender can transmit content without revealing his
or her identity.193 Essentially, a sender can share an “AirDropped”
image without the recipient’s consent; even when a recipient declines
the image, he or she has still been forced to view it.
Often, AirDrop cyber-flashing occurs on public transit.194 Because
recipients know they are in physical proximity to the sender, many
fear that the sender will “take the harassment from [the] phone to real
life.”195 For example, one victim who was riding the Washington, D.C.
Metro when she was cyber-flashed expressed concern with “the notion
that whoever sent her the lewd photo was somewhere near her.”196
The victim stated: “If someone is willing to do that, that’s not a person
that I necessarily want to be in a metal tube under the ground
with . . . .”197 In response, a spokesperson said that the Metro encour-
ages the public to change their AirDrop settings to “off” or “contacts
185. Doherty, supra note 184.
186. See id.
187. See Palermino, supra note 45.
188. Caroline Knorr, What’s AirDrop and Why Are Kids Using It?, HUFFPOST





192. North, supra note 28.
193. Id.
194. Rachel Kurzius, Someone AirDropped a Woman an Unsolicited Dick Pic Dur-
ing Her Metro Commute, DCIST (Mar. 11, 2019, 2:59 PM), https://dcist.com/story/19/
03/11/someone-airdropped-a-woman-an-unsolicited-dick-pic-during-her-metro-com-
mute/ [https://perma.cc/U5QX-BR6F].
195. Palermino, supra note 45.
196. Kurzius, supra note 194.
197. Id.
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only” while travelling to avoid being cyber-flashed.198 Other victims
have received similar advice.199 Some report that routinely ensuring
AirDrop, which many set to “everyone” for work or other purposes, is
set to “contacts only” is part of their checklist for their commutes
home.200 Some women change the “name” of their phone that appears
to the public for AirDrop purposes to men’s names to prevent cyber-
flashing—and it works.201 But should the onus be on victims to take
action against cyber-flashing? Victims argue that “women don’t need
another ‘to-do’ to keep . . . from getting harassed.”202 Others express
anger: “Why should I have to stop using my phone how I want? . . . I
hate that men control how I behave.”203 This sort of response is vic-
tim-blaming, by focusing on what the victim should have done to pre-
vent the cyber-flashing rather than the actions of the perpetrator.204
The fear of an AirDrop cyber-flasher taking harassment from the
phone to real life is exactly the same concern embedded in indecent
exposure statutes—the fear that an exposer might move on to a physi-
cal or sexual assault. As one woman stated: “How do I know the guy
is not going to get violent if I speak up?”205 Many victims view cyber-
flashing as sexual harassment and even sexual violence, especially
when it takes place within physical proximity.206 Additionally, many
AirDrop cyber-flashing victims believe that the sender’s intent is to
upset, alarm, or intimidate the recipients and to get a reaction from
them.207 Many women feel specifically targeted.208 Cyber-flashing vic-
tims also report feeling uncomfortable or unsafe to the extent that
they change train cars or take alternate routes home to avoid both
being cyber-flashed generally and being in physical proximity to a
sender.209 Some women even fear that the sender may be watching
them or may follow them off a train or bus.210 One woman who was
cyber-flashed at a train station reported that the sender slowly ap-
proached her while repeatedly sending her explicit images, maintain-
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Palermino, supra note 45.
201. Sophie Gallagher, Would You Rename Your Phone to Avoid Unsolicited Dick




202. Palermino, supra note 45.
203. Gallagher, supra note 201.
204. Thompson, supra note 51.
205. Gallagher, supra note 184.
206. See id.
207. Id.; Palermino, supra note 45.
208. Gallagher, supra note 184; Thompson, supra note 51.
209. Palermino, supra note 45; Gallagher, supra note 201.
210. Gallagher, supra note 184.
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ing eye contact, and waiting for her reaction.211 Later, as she boarded
her train, she saw the man had followed her and was watching her.212
Another major concern occurs when the volume or frequency of
unsolicited sexually explicit images disrupts a recipient’s daily life or
makes a recipient fear for her safety. Women who receive AirDrop-
ped explicit images during their commutes often decline the images,
only to have them reappear on their screens—again and again.213 De-
spite recipients declining the images, the cyber-flashers in these cases
continuously sent explicit photos, in one case with such frequency that
the victim could not access her settings screen to turn off the AirDrop
feature.214 The same victim reported that the sender’s physical prox-
imity and persistence made her feel violated and unsettled.215 One
Texas woman moved to a new address and changed her phone number
out of fear because she continuously received unsolicited sexually ex-
plicit photos from strangers—hundreds of them.216 She filed a police
report and blocked the senders but said there was nothing else she
could do because the senders continued to make new accounts with
which to send her the images.217 She expressed concern that cyber-
flashing at this level of intensity is a threat to victims’ safety: “It goes
unnoticed until something happens to the person.”218 Effectively,
high-volume cyber-flashing is very similar to stalking.219 In Texas,
stalking is a felony crime.220 A person is guilty of stalking under Texas
Penal Code section 42.072 when he knowingly and repeatedly engages
in conduct targeted at a specific person, which he “knows or reasona-
bly should know the other person will regard as threatening,” and that
would cause a reasonable person to feel threatened.221 Section 42.072
illustrates Texas lawmakers’ concern with preventing and punishing
crimes in which victims feel threatened or harassed. Texas has a sub-
stantial interest in regulating behavior with these consequences—con-
sequences that also result from cyber-flashing.
211. Sophie Gallagher, ‘He Was Staring at Me Across the Concourse, His Hands
Were Shaking’: Why Cyber Flashing Isn’t Just a Digital Problem, HUFFPOST, https://
www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/he-was-staring-at-me-across-the-concourse-his-
hands-were-shaking-why-cyberflashing-isnt-just-a-digital-problem_uk_5ca1ca0de4
b0bc0dacab0dd0?utm_hp_ref=UK-cyberflashing (July 12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
J9CC-UCEN].
212. Id.
213. Thompson, supra note 51.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Cruz, supra note 31.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Asher Flynn, Cyberflashing – Old-Style Sexual Harassment for the Digital
Age, MONASH UNIV. (Sept. 6, 2019), https://lens.monash.edu/@politics-society/2019/
09/06/1376441/cyberflashing-the-latest-form-of-digital-sexual-harassment [https://
perma.cc/FX2S-BWR3].
220. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072(b).
221. See id. § 42.072(a).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-2\TWL205.txt unknown Seq: 24  8-FEB-21 10:48
446 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
Much dialogue surrounding this issue indicates that victims perceive
cyber-flashing as sexual harassment, and ultimately, a threat to their
safety. Even many men who send sexually explicit images believe that
women find cyber-flashing an uncomfortable experience.222 In one
study, 29% of men who sent dick pics said they believe women find
them distressing, while 24% said they believe women find them
threatening.223 Laura Thompson, a researcher who investigates online
abuse and harassment, says that women are taught to protect them-
selves from sexual harm and that such “safety work” is a “never-end-
ing task.”224 She says this impacts women’s “freedom, sense of
security, and ability to occupy public spaces,” and argues that because
bad actors can now use digital communication methods to harass via
“image-based sexual offences, this unjust burden on women is grow-
ing.”225 Organizations that focus on awareness and prevention of gen-
der-based violence have pushed for the criminalization of cyber-
flashing.226 Even Whitney Wolfe Herd, the driving force behind sec-
tion 21.19, expressed that the statute’s purpose in part is to address
“the safety of young adults . . . using technology.”227 Many women
believe that cyber-flashing feels more targeted and personal than run-
of-the-mill street harassment, ultimately making it feel more threaten-
ing.228 Many, if not most, women who have been cyber-flashed have
not reported the incident.229 They believe it will not be taken seriously
or will be dismissed as a prank.230 However, many victims say that if
cyber-flashing was prohibited by law, they would be much more likely
to report it;231 and now, in Texas, they have the opportunity to do so.
Cyber-flashing is more than a mere annoyance and is something to be
taken seriously—conduct that is forcing victims to alter their own be-
havior to avoid uncomfortable or unsafe situations. Ultimately, the
litany of dialogue on cyber-flashing and its consequences shows that
the act of cyber-flashing contains a significant threat element, even if
not all recipients of unsolicited sexually explicit images report feeling
threatened or intimidated.
222. Matthew Smith, Four in Ten Female Millennials Have Been Sent an Unsolicited




224. Researcher Discusses ‘Unjust Burden’, supra note 27.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Previous Campaigns, THE EMPOWER PROJECT, https://www.theempow
erproject.co.uk/prevcampaigns [https://perma.cc/ZUV8-35SU].
227. Cobler, supra note 1.
228. Gallagher, supra note 201.
229. See Gallagher, supra note 184.
230. Gil, supra note 3.
231. Gallagher, supra note 201; Gallagher, supra note 184.
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C. Constitutionality of Section 21.19 Under the True Threat
Doctrine
The threat element embedded in cyber-flashing emerges from the
perception that cyber-flashing is a form of sexual harassment and sex-
ual violence. Section 21.19 was enacted to address these issues and
protect individuals from unsolicited sexually explicit material and the
fears that come with it. Thus, section 21.19 is likely constitutional
under the true threat doctrine.
Even without considering cyber-flashing as threatening conduct, it
likely already has reduced First Amendment protection, because it in-
volves both nudity and foisting unsolicited sexually explicit material
on another individual. Cyber-flashing is indecent speech that is  so-
cially undesirable and offensive—which alone does not justify its sup-
pression.232 However, the Supreme Court has held that regulating
indecency or nudity to further a substantial and legitimate govern-
ment interest in “protecting order and morality” is permissible,
whether or not it may have expressive qualities.233 Because such inde-
cency is “certainly [an] area[] of respectable and substantial govern-
mental interest,”234 the Texas government may prevent the physical
act of indecent exposure; therefore, Texas may similarly prevent acts
like cyber-flashing. Notably, the court in Kew v. Senter doubted
whether any ideas or speech protected by the First Amendment could
be solely or best expressed through exposing genitals to another per-
son in a sexually explicit manner prohibited by statute.235 While trans-
mitting sexually explicit images to another person via cyber-flashing
may have some expressive value, section 21.19 specifically targets in-
decent conduct and physical exposure through digital means; it does
not aim to curb any potential expressive quality of the images.236
While perhaps there is some expressive speech that cyber-flashing
conveys—for example, expression of a romantic interest—the govern-
ment’s substantial and legitimate interest in regulating the indecent
conduct itself “justif[ies the] incidental limitations on First Amend-
ment freedoms.”237
Because many individuals consider cyber-flashing a threatening or
intimidating experience, and because it is likely already subject to re-
duced First Amendment protections—“within [its] outer perime-
ters”238—regulation of cyber-flashing by section 21.19 is likely
232. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the ex-
pression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”).
233. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 571–72 (1991).
234. Kew v. Senter, 416 F. Supp. 1101, 1105 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
235. Id.
236. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.19.
237. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
238. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566.
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constitutional under the true threat doctrine. Under current Texas
law, a “reasonable listener” need only reasonably believe that speech
is a threat in order for regulation to be permissible. Many cyber-flash-
ing victims reasonably interpret sexually explicit images they receive
to be threats of violence or intimidation, whether because they receive
such images in a particular location or manner, or even from a particu-
lar individual. Even if such indecent speech may have expressive
value, Texas has a substantial interest in regulating and prohibiting
such behavior to protect cyber-flashing victims from fear of violence,
just as it does with physical indecent exposure. Thus, section 21.19’s
regulation of cyber-flashing is very likely permissible and constitu-
tional under the true threat doctrine.
IV. IMPROVING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 21.19
Although section 21.19 is likely constitutional under the true threat
doctrine, in the alternative, Texas could amend the statute’s language
to better ensure it survives constitutional challenges by adding an “af-
front or alarm” requirement. This element is a commonality among
indecent exposure statutes, which typically survive First Amendment
challenges. Such a requirement could help strengthen section 21.19
against First Amendment attacks while ensuring the goals of prevent-
ing and punishing cyber-flashing are met.
While section 21.19 contains an existing non-consent element, there
are no guarantees that this provision will alone ensure its constitution-
ality.239 To err on the side of caution, Texas could amend the statute to
add an “affront or alarm” requirement similar to the proposed cyber-
flashing bill in New York City or Texas’s own section 21.08 indecent
exposure statute. For example, section 21.19 could implement “reck-
lessness” language similar to section 21.08, such as:
A person commits an offense if he knowingly transmits by elec-
tronic means sexually explicit content that is not sent at the request
or with the express consent of the recipient and is reckless about
whether another person will be offended or alarmed by his act.
Or Texas could adopt intent-based language resembling the New York
City cyber-flashing bill, which would criminalize “send[ing] an unsolic-
ited sexually explicit video or image to another person with intent to
harass, annoy or alarm such other person.”240 Both a recklessness re-
quirement and an intent requirement present viable options to ensure
section 21.19’s constitutionality.
239. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973).
240. N.Y.C. Council Int. No. 1244 (2018), https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/Legisla-
tionDetail.aspx?ID=3763643&GUID=F06C28F9-16D1-4DDA-82D7-372C94B8E84D
[https://perma.cc/B6H5-TEXE] (quoting bill summary).
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V. CONCLUSION
As technology and online communication continue to evolve, legis-
latures and courts are struggling to determine the government’s role
in regulating social media and the digital world. Cyber-flashing has
become commonplace; most people have probably either been cyber-
flashed or know someone who has. Just as many new statutes are in-
troduced to address novel issues, Texas’s section 21.19 was enacted to
combat a growing new problem in modern society. While it is now
socially acceptable to consensually share intimate and sexually explicit
images through digital communication, a serious problem arises when
a person transmits such images without solicitation or the recipient’s
consent. Unsolicited sharing of sexually explicit material is not viewed
in the same manner as consensual sharing—so it should not be treated
the same either. Cyber-flashing victims view it as sexual harassment
and even as a form of sexual violence, and many feel intimidated, dis-
tressed, and threatened by it.
Although critics argue that section 21.19 may be unconstitutional as
a restriction on free speech, speech which conveys threats of violence
against individuals is not protected by the First Amendment—and
thus can be regulated by state governments. Most women who report
feeling threatened by cyber-flashing are likely reasonable in that be-
lief, which is all the law requires in Texas to regulate speech under the
true threat doctrine. And even if section 21.19 is found to violate the
First Amendment as is, legislators can codify an “affront or alarm”
requirement similar to those in indecent exposure statutes to ensure
its constitutionality. Ultimately, the purposes of the true threat doc-
trine are reflected in section 21.19 and the Texas government’s deci-
sion to regulate cyber-flashing: to protect individuals “from the fear of
violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possi-
bility that the threatened violence will occur.”241 As one of the first
states to enact a cyber-flashing law, Texas has taken a stance, asserted
that this type of behavior will not be taken lightly, and set an example
for other states that may want to follow suit in enacting legislation to
combat cyber-flashing.
241. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
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